Evolution of a roster: NYCFC’s salary trends

Photo credit: Arturo Pardavila III (Creative Commons license)

When it was announced on May 21, 2013 that Major League Soccer (MLS) had granted a franchise in New York City — to be owned by Manchester City conglomorate City Football Group (CFG) and the New York Yankees, no less — high expectations were immediately placed on the nascent NYCFC.

Part of the expectations came from the simple fact that the club would be playing in the largest market in the league, which was very much untapped despite the presence of the New York Red Bulls across the Hudson River. Similarly, the success of the Red Bulls — who have made every iteration of the MLS Cup Playoffs, finishing at or near the top of the Eastern Conference and ultimately winning the Supporters’ Shield in 2013 — added the weight of a certain level of on-field performance to the new fan base’s expectations.

But because of the size of the market, as well as the fact that CFG and the Yankees represented what was certainly among the wealthiest ownership groups in the league, there was an added burden — the team was expected to spend as big as was possible under the confines of the restrictive MLS salary cap. That meant three Designated Players (DPs), utilizing the new allocation money systems to the fullest and stocking up on premier domestic talent.

The club’s first signing was no slouch, as World Cup winner and Spanish international David Villa would mark the club’s opening epoch — ultimately providing the club with their first beloved captain. Controversies aside, the signings of Frank Lampard and Andrea Pirlo (midway through the year) ticked the big-name box and placed a firm check next to the “three DPs” requirement. Additionally, the club used the new Targeted Allocation Money (TAM) clause to bring in a young U.S. men’s national team member over the usual DP threshold in Mix Diskerud. While the latter didn’t quite pan out — at all — the big names many expected were present in abundance.

With CFG aware of the struggles traditionally encountered by foreign ownership and foreign coaches in MLS, the club reached out to a proven winner to lead from the bench in year one, agreeing to terms with Jason Kreis, winner of the 2009 MLS Cup with Real Salt Lake, as the club’s first head coach. Kreis filled the remainder of his roster with a mixture of his RSL boys from his previous gig, some foreign internationals and loans scouted out by CFG, and a few unknown domestics such as RJ Allen and Kwadwo Poku.

Year one didn’t go as planned for NYCFC, finishing outside of the playoffs with 37 points. Kreis was fired, Arsenal legend Patrick Vieira was brought in and behind the scenes CFG tinkered and toyed with their USA-based club’s building philosophy. The changes in construction methodology are worth examining, as NYCFC from 2016 forward has been a regular contending force near the top of the league. So what changed?

2015

We begin in the club’s inaugural season. The annual salary information available through the MLS Players Association enables us to look and paint a clear picture of the philosophy that went into building NYCFC’s first team in year one.

The immediate item of note is the number of players in the low-end range (<$100,000). Fifteen of the 28 available players come from this salary range, typically reserved for bench depth or low-end starters at most clubs. Another nine come from just above this range, with four costing below $200,000 and five more costing below $300,000. That means 85.71 percent of NYCFC’s first roster consisted of these players.

The final four players — Villa, Lampard, Pirlo and Diskerud — all came in above the $700,000 threshold. Pirlo’s midsummer arrival meant his prorated salary cost the team slightly over $2 million, while Villa and Lampard both broke the $5 million barrier near the league’s highest earners. The massive gap in talent — with zero players between $300,000-$700,000 — was noticeable, with very few players standing out as higher-end starters. The team’s total base salary and guaranteed compensation were the second highest of its four years of existence, yet yielded the worst results.

Several players performed over their values. Allen, Mehdi Ballouchy, Thomas McNamara, Kwadwo Poku and others proved good investments for the team’s first season. But a number of albatrosses limited their overall value, with Lampard not arriving until midseason and dealing with a hamstring injury as well, Diskerud proving unproductive and Ned Grabavoy and Javier Calle seeing far too many minutes for their level of performance.

As expected, many players followed their coach out of the club at the end of the failed campaign, leading to some significant changes for year two.

2016

The sophomore campaign for NYCFC saw the club’s base salaries and guaranteed compensation rise to their highest respective peaks in its four-year history so far. Each broke the $20 million barrier (base salaries – $20,790,176.54, guaranteed compensation – $21,313,808.21) in Patrick Vieira’s first season in charge.

The rise in total money spent corresponded to the beginnings of the overall trend of changes seen in spend per player. NYCFC dropped the number of players in the low-end range making less than $100,000 from 15 to 11, notably through the departures of Pablo Alvarez, Ryan Meara, Patrick Mullins, Kwadwo Poku, loanee Angelino, Sebastian Velasquez and Kwame Watson-Siriboe. The club simultaneously added Shannon Gomez, Mikey Lopez, Andre Rawls and Ethan White. The final noteworthy change in this range was an increase in goalkeeper Josh Saunders salary from $90,000 to $150,000 for 2016. Saunders — who shined through the lens of a cracked and broken back four in 2015 to the tune of 123 saves — floundered in 2016 with a stronger defense that required him to save the fewer legitimate scoring opportunities that came through. This would prompt a future move for Sean Johnson, who would come at a higher cost, but indisputably provide far better value.

Despite Saunders transition taking the $100,000-$199,999 bracket from four to five members, Pirlo’s jump full-time into the $5 million-plus range in his first full season with the club, and the addition of Maxime Chanot breaking the club into the $300,000-$399,999 range, the remaining roster composition remained largely unchanged in terms of salary (though changed significantly in personnel). Nevertheless, the foundation for the longer-term change was set: spend less on low-end players, prepare to spend less on high-end ones and target a big increase in mid-range spending.

The opening move of this strategy — combined with Vieira’s tactical shift into living or dying by playing possession from the rear — prompted NYCFC’s rise into a playoff-caliber club, beginning its status as a regular contender. The season’s success likely promoted CFG to expand the nascent philosophy and those changes would become readily apparent in 2017 and 2018.

It’s also worth noting that while CFG had likely already decided at this point that the aging European star DP archetype was outdated, the performances of Lampard (1,280 mins, 12 goals, three assists) and Pirlo (2,770 mins, one goal, 11 assists) were very positive. Nonetheless, the club would move on from Lampard at the conclusion of the season as the future Derby manager called it quits on his playing career. Pirlo would continue with the club in 2017, but 2016 would prove to be his final successful season before his own retirement. Villa is an anomaly and a legend.

2017

The club’s third season marks the first true shift into what NYCFC would become by the end of 2018, posting the lowest base salaries ($16,476,456.72) and guaranteed compensation ($17,074,063.39) in team history. However, while that statistic does indicate a valid trend in CFG’s spending philosophy, it is misleading on its surface.

NYCFC didn’t simply spend less money, it spent less money on more players more efficiently. Taking into consideration the departure of Lampard and his $6 million salary number, the team actually increased spending across the rest of its roster by nearly $2 million. A big chunk of that change was new Argentinian DP Maxi Moralez, who’s archetype fit more alongside that of Sebastian Giovinco as a middle-aged, high-level talent still in his prime. Moralez as a 29-year-old (at the time of his signing, now 31) fit a transitory role between the aging DPs of old and the future, high-upside, low-20s South American archetype that would become prevalent across the league. The former Atalanta and Leon man was productive in year one, with five goals and nine assists, showing that spending $5 million-plus isn’t necessary to find high-caliber talent. This coincides with the additional departure of Diskerud, as the USMNT midfielder-turned-pariah was officially exfiltrated by CFG to sister club Manchester City and turned out on loan elsewhere in Europe.

Interestingly, the low-range of less than $100,000 reversed trend from 2016 and increased from 11 to 14 players, though this was likely simply due to an increase in total roster count from 26 to 28. Joining the low-end range were several valuable pieces such as Ben Sweat, who proved a major addition as a cheap, domestic fullback who filled in brilliantly for the injured Ronald Matarrita the majority of the season. Also included in this range was the club’s first Homegrown signing in midfielder/defender James Sands, noteworthy for the rise of the club’s academy and further proof of CFG’s dedication to finding affordable, high-quality talent instead of blowing big bucks.

Also of note was a rise in the $100,000-$199,999 range with the additions of valuable players such as Alex Callens and Johnson, each of whom would become a core part of the starting XI in both 2017 and 2018, and among the top at their positions league-wide. Similarly, the addition of Alex Ring at the $300,000-$399,999 range gave NYCFC one of MLS’ premier defensive midfielders, fixing what had been a major problem in the club’s first two seasons.

The addition of high-end, cheap midfield talent like Ring and Moralez ultimately spelled the end of Pirlo’s playing time, as the 38-year-old Italian simply didn’t have the legs to provide the joint offensive and defensive effort required in Vieira’s tightly-controlled system. The lack of performance from the club’s most expensive player was a major disappointment in 2017, and likely prompted CFG to look even younger for their next DP, which would become evident in 2018.

2018

The final form of NYCFC’s current evolution; the club’s 2018 roster is the epitome of balance, with players occupying the greatest number of salary ranges in healthy numbers and with only Villa earning more than $3 million-plus.

In addition to the lowest base salaries ($13,874,057.71) and guaranteed compensation ($14,824,390.78) in club history — again thanks to the departure of a high-paid European DP in Pirlo — the club had the fewest representatives in the lowest (sub-$100,000) and highest ($5 million-plus) ranges in history and the most representatives in upper-middle ranges from $200,000-$699,999.

The club received limited value from the 10 sub-$100,000 players on its roster, though Sweat and Sebastien Ibeagha helped fill in tremendously during injuries, international breaks and rotational shifts. The same can be said of the next range up from $100,000-$199,999, with Saad Abdul-Salaam, Valentin Castellanos and Thomas McNamara providing limited minutes — Castellanos arrived midseason and led the group with 446 and one goal, with the young midfielder clearly signed for the future.

The $200,000-$299,999 range is where the club begins to shine with five entrants. While Eloi Amagat and the oft-injured Cedric Hountondji are nothing to write home about, Yangel Herrera cemented himself as one of the most talented young players league-wide, fueling speculation about a European move in 2019 for the Manchester City loanee. Johnson continued his dominant performances in goal, while Matarrita performed effectively in his time not injured or away on international duty with Costa Rica.

The $300,000-$399,999 range was equally as effective. The club’s evolving philosophy can best be exemplified by this group, which rose from zero members in 2015, to one in 2016, two in 2017 and finally five in 2018. After the previously successful additions of Maxime Chanot and Ring (who earned himself a generous raise out of this range in 2018), the club added Anton Tinnerholm at right back and Ismael Tajouri-Shradi at winger, the latter of whom was a revelation during Villa’s absences due to injury with the most effective dollars-per-goal of any player on the roster ($29,090.91 per for 11 total goals). A pay increase for Rodney Wallace also placed the left winger in this range, though that’s a fact that will likely displease most fans due to his lackluster performances and limited playing time. But Wallace is the exception in an otherwise exceptional group of players.

Four players made up the $500,000-$599,999 and $600,000-$699,999 ranges, where no players previously sat in the past three seasons. In the upper echelon of this group sit forward Jo Inge Berget — who’s four goals and three assists deceptively don’t represent the valuable off-ball work he added to free space for his fellow attackers, most notably Tajouri-Shradi — and new DP Jesus Medina. In addition to Medina’s six goals and seven assists as a dynamic, technically exciting winger, his signing represents the final shift in CFG’s DP strategy to date, joining the likes of Atlanta United FC and LAFC in finding young, talented South Americans on relatively cheap DP deals with the intent of selling on future value.

The other two members of the $500,000-$599,999 range consist of Ring and Callens, who each received a healthy raise for their previous performances, locking the two mid-20s-year-old talents up for the foreseeable future, much to the happiness of City fans.

Charts and Summary

While the charts and results from NYCFC’s four seasons to date speak for themselves on the success of CFG’s endeavors in evolving its club’s financial philosophy, what’s perhaps more significant is the microcosm this represents in MLS’ overall plan for the league. There has been a noted move towards signing young, high-potential South Americans such as Miguel Almiron, Medina, Diego Rossi and the like, and a shift away from the aging European DPs of old (though with notable successful exceptions such as Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Wayne Rooney).

MLS has clearly made a concerted effort to revitalize from a final playing field for aging veterans and into a home for some undervalued players in their prime (a la Moralez and Giovinco) and up-and-coming stars from the South looking to use North America as a launching platform to bigger things. How much of this is league-driven and directed versus teams simply figuring out an efficient and optimal spending strategy to maximize points while minimizing spend remains to be seen. But there is a clear benefit that clubs are seeing and jumping on, and those that do seem to be the most successful in recent seasons.

There are certainly alternative methods of success, particularly if your club has a strong academy system and can rely on cheap, undervalued domestic talent such as the New York Red Bulls, FC Dallas and the Philadelphia Union — and the parity in MLS is such that a team like D.C. United or the LA Galaxy can lag behind the changing times somewhat and still find success in any given year.

Still, several passages from Soccernomics — authored by economists Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski, though certainly not a flawless book — spring to mind when considering the current state of the league and clubs like NYCFC. Historically, in England, there is a category of player that is undervalued by clubs on a national scale. Previously, English players were seen as the epitome of soccer talent and performance, and it wasn’t conceivable that non-English players (and some South Americans) could compete at the same level. African players were hugely undervalued. The first clubs to realize the folly of that assumption and start tapping into those undervalued sources — spending less for the same or even better performances in some cases — were ultimately some of the most successful due to their financial efficiency.

The lessons learned by CFG through NYCFC’s first four seasons appear to mirror that period, although MLS as a whole appears to be going through this change more simultaneously than those individual English clubs at the time. Aging European DPs and mid-to-low-level domestic talent are highly overvalued in MLS. Nearly every team has historically sought out players in those categories to build their rosters. Young South Americans and undervalued players elsewhere in their primes have traditionally been overlooked by MLS clubs. While every organization can’t have the comprehensive scouting network of CFG or the South American connections of Atlanta United, more and more clubs are following suit by turning their view towards the historical powerhouse continent for their more affordable talent.

NYCFC and clubs like it have been somewhat ahead of the curve and have flourished as a result — particularly after early mistakes — but it will be interesting to see where this roster evolution moves in the future. For now, it has been a fascinating shift in thinking that has yielded immediate results.

Follow Colton on Twitter: @cjcoreschi.

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